The South East Queensland (SEQ) flood event was caused by a low pressure system over Queensland’s southern coast that dragged moisture from the Coral Sea in the north. From 22 February to 7 March, the Brisbane, Maryborough, Gympie, Sunshine Coast, Caboolture, Toowoomba, Ipswich, Logan and Gold Coast areas suffered major flooding as a result of intense rainfall which led to flash flooding and riverine flooding across large areas of South East Queensland.

Resourcing 

Disaster management in Queensland requires local, district and state groups, government agencies and non-government organisations to work effectively together under Queensland’s disaster management arrangements. The multiple stakeholders have a range of diverse and significant responsibilities and the capacity and effectiveness of the system and its functioning is dependent on continuous maintenance of these relationships and associated functions.

During the SEQ flood event, a total of 23 local disaster management groups (LDMGs) and eight district disaster management groups (DDMGs) were activated, with Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) regional operational centres established in each of the impacted regions. The intensity and extended duration of the event resulted in a total of 1,623 State Emergency Service (SES) volunteers delivering and supporting emergency services activities which totalled over 36,200 hours of effort. The main focus of that effort was directed towards temporary repairs, sandbagging and flood boat operations. Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) swift water teams were also heavily involved in the event and in total, over 8,100 tasks were completed by QFES personnel.

A coordinated effort across the arrangements was maintained with effective online and in-person communications via online updates and daily briefings and debriefings. The inclusion of QFES emergency management coordinators and liaison officers was critical in supporting the coordinated effort from LDMGs and DDMGs to QFES incident command. This created the ability to extend situational awareness and communication which, in turn, supported an efficient and coordinated response to what was a large scale event.

The SEQ flood event evolved rapidly and placed considerable and complex demands on emergency services over a sustained period. From 24 -27 February, Wivenhoe Dam capacity rose from 58.7% to 183.9%. Peak flooding occurred from 25-27 February and the Bureau of Meteorology map issued on 27 February, five days into the event, provides an appreciation for the scale and areas impacted. Rainfall totals for the 6 days ending on 28 February were at least 2.5 times the February average rainfallacross the South East Queensland area, with some parts of Queensland receiving more than 5 times their monthly average rainfall for February.

In response, FRS motorised swift water rescue teams were deployed throughout affected regions, supported by SES flood boat crews, who worked in collaboration with Queensland Police Service and Surf Life Saving Queensland personnel. All available assets and technology were used, with aircraft deployed on more than 40 occasions with operational response activities also supported by remotely piloted aircraft systems to provide tactical information for personnel.

Historically, this type of geographically isolating event hampers attendance to certain locations and some regional communities become increasingly isolated during the event. Consequently, the stakeholders in Queensland’s disaster management arrangements continue to adopt a multi-modal approach to emergency communications through the utilisation of social media including Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, as well as websites that support the use of emergency alerts. A total of 182 emergency alerts were issued, with QFES social media contributing a total of 404 posts to the various platforms, with a reach of over 37 million and an engagement of 452,796.

27 February saw the peak of activity in relation to both the volume of triple zero and SES 132 500 calls tasked by both SES and QFES FRS, as well as the number of people evacuated. Rainfall in the Brisbane region was approximately 3 times that experienced the previous day.

On 28 February, the Brisbane River peaked at 3.85 m. In comparison, the Brisbane River's peak during the 2011 floods was 4.46 m. Once the intense rain across the state ceased, riverine flooding remained a concern for several days as the water slowly receded and water continued to be released from the dams. 

Over 170 suburbs in the greater Brisbane region were impacted;1 almost double the impact of the 2011 floods.2 In total, QFES received 16,243 requests for assistance either through calls to triple zero, SES 132 500 or through the SES Assistance QLD app, with 8,184 tasks completed.

Impact 

From 22 February to 7 March, the sustained rainfall and subsequent flooding resulted in the loss of 13 lives, including the tragic death of SES volunteer Merryl Dray. The event also saw more than 90 rescues carried out by QFES with over 330 people evacuated. The Minister for Police and Corrective Services and Minister for Fire and Emergency Services declared disasters in the Disaster District of Gympie on 26 February and the Brisbane Local Government Area and Disaster District of Maryborough on 27 February.

During the event period QFES completed 16,485 damage assessments. The human and social impact of the event was significant, with more than 180,000 people losing power and 613 education facilities impacted, including 88 schools suffering damage. Over 1,700km of roads were closed or under restricted access. The economic cost resulted in over 98,000 insurance claims at a cost of $1.38 billion with an estimated impact on small business to be greater than $328 million.

Following the SEQ flood event, 23 local government areas were activated under the joint Commonwealth State Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA) to enable those impacted to have access to DRFA funding.3 On 15 March, the Premier of Queensland announced that the Office of the Inspector General of Emergency Management (IGEM) would undertake a review of Queensland’s response to the event. At the time of writing, the IGEM report is yet to be released.