Seasonal outlooks produced by the Department of Fire and Emergency Service (DFES) in spring and summer identified that late winter rainfall had alleviated a prolonged drought over the southwest of Western Australia. This resulted in an environment which promoted good growth of vegetation and crops alike. This growth resulted in fuel loads which were above what would be considered normal for the time of year in many locations.

Summer outlooks also identified above normal fire potential in large areas of the southwest amongst other areas of interest. During December, successive heatwaves ensured the curing of this fuel increased rapidly and left the landscape of the southwest primed in the event of any fire incidents. Throughout January prolonged high temperatures and continuing heatwaves combined with a series of troughs ensured the southern half of Western Australia was set for an extended period of significantly elevated fire risk. The weather in Western Australia was in stark contrast to the eastern states where emergency services were responding to significant flooding events which would continue to for several months.

The development of a deep trough along the west coast on 3 February resulted in an environment with sustained winds above 40 km/h and temperatures well above 40°C. The passage of this trough inland would lead to risks elevating from coastal areas to inland areas over a period of several days. The consequential fire danger ratings were exceedingly unusual for many of the areas included in the forecast and resulted in Catastrophic ratings in areas which had never recorded these before. The instability of the atmosphere was also reflected in the C Haines values exceeding 12 for much of the southwest on 5 February and 13 for large areas of the southwest by 6 February.

The weather system was forecast to rapidly change from the deep trough to a deep low-pressure system from late on 6 February and bring with it a much cooler environment with cold wet weather by 7 February. It was evident though that the passage of this trough would present significant challenges in preventing and responding to the ignition of fires in the landscape prior to any respite that the weather change presented.

The development of the significant fire weather in the southwest followed a sustained period of activity in the North West of the state with the passage of a Tropical Low which had impacted Broome and surrounding areas during the previous week. Prior to the first incident, 6 of the 9 DFES regions had increased their forecast risk status to Moderate, and the State Operations Centre (SOC) pre-emptively triggered a major risk response across the state. This resulted in the activation of several predetermined processes which ensured broad coverage of the risk areas from both a staffing and resourcing perspective.

The development of the weather systems was closely monitored in the lead up by the DFES SOC, and ahead of the first ignition a range of measures to prevent and limit fires were implemented. The response to these emergencies required significant statewide coordination involving numerous emergency management partner agencies. 

Recent breaching of the Transcontinental Railway by flooding had led to supply shortages across the state and reliance on road networks. The participation of parties involved in state freight supply planning was essential, in addition to traditional partners and stakeholders. The coordination of the involvement of external stakeholders was managed by the DFES SOC. With the exemption of the far north of the state, the DFES SOC implemented Total Fire Bans (TFB) for most of the state in consultation with local governments and other stakeholders. Whilst many areas met TFB triggers, many others were included as preventative measures. These were supported by local governments implementing harvest and vehicle movement bans to complement the DFES preparations. These pre-emptive measures prior to the incidents no doubt played a significant role in ensuring that the number of potential incidents was minimised.

Bayview Rise bushfire 

The first significant ignition began in the Shire of Denmark, approximately 400 km south of Perth, and became known as the Bayview Rise bushfire. The fire was reported at 9.28am on 4 February. Reports from initial crews indicated that the firewas escalating, and four aerial assets were mobilised to assist. Throughout the incident 80 appliances and 130 firefighters from various agencies were activated to bring the blaze under control. This was in line with directives from the Duty Assistant Commissioner to ensure an additional weight of response commensurate with the heighted fire danger risk. The fire was escalated to a Level 2 incident by 4.00pm that afternoon and subsequently Level 3 by 11.00pm. Numerous Emergency Warnings were issued to the community in the Shire of Denmark and evacuations of residents were facilitated.

At 6.00am on 5 February a Level 3 incident was declared, which triggered the mobilisation of a pre-formed Incident Management Team (IMT). Logistical support caches were also mobilised at this time to assist with mobile infrastructure for the IMT. The DFES SOC requested the mobilisation of a 36 person IMT from New South Wales to assist with further incidents should they occur due to the significant mobilisation to the Bayview Rise Bushfire. This was accomplished through the AFAC National Resource Sharing Centre (NRSC) and ensured Western Australia would remain able to respond accordingly to any further large-scale incidents.

The fire impacted an area of 2,200 ha as it rapidly spread through steep challenging forest and rural terrain to the East of Denmark. This resulted in the loss of 4 houses and 9 additional structures. The fire remained a Level 3 incident until more favourable weather and light rain on 6 February assisted responders. The incident was downgraded to Level 2 on the morning of 7 February before being further downgraded on 10 February.

Bridgetown bushfire 

Whilst the Denmark incident was still escalating, a second incident in the Shire of Bridgetown-Greenbushes commenced at 1.19pm on 5 February, 230 km south of Perth. The Bridgetown bushfire escalated very quickly to Level 2 by 3.05pm and Level 3 by 3.56pm. It was clear that this fire would also create significant disruption and losses. This was evident with the closure of the South Western Highway during the afternoon of the following day, causing transport disruptions throughout the southwest. This compounded the existing supply chain issues existing from the Transcontinental Railway outages in the previous months and shortages caused by the global pandemic.

This fire impacted an area of 2,206 ha through similar terrain to the Bayview Rise bushfire to the north of Bridgetown. Eight houses and 15 additional structures were reported as lost over the course of this incident. Many more properties were reported as saved, which is testament to the hard work of responders in difficult terrain and weather. Significantly, this fire resulted in the loss of a timber treatment facility which also created a hazardous materials risk to the surrounding communities. While the favourable weather on the evening of 6 February also assisted the responding crews at the Bridgetown Bushfire, the complexities of the incident’s location and impact resulted in the incident remaining at Level 2 until 12 February.

Despite the area of this fire being smaller, the difficult terrain required more than 270 responding personnel and utilised in excess of 6000 hours of effort from both volunteer and career services to bring resolution to this incident

Shackleton Complex bushfire

While a Severe fire danger rating had been observed in many areas throughout 5 February, the most significant weather was observed on 6 February. Several locations throughout the Wheatbelt reported Catastrophic fire conditions very early and at 9.23am a fire, which became known as the Shackleton Complex bushfire, in the Shires of Bruce Rock, Quairading and Corrigin commenced 220 km East of Perth. Due to the forecast conditions, incident management personnel and aircraft consisting of a Level 3 team and five rotary wing aircraft had been pre-staged in the town of Northam, 100 km closer than normal operating bases. Additionally, a Large Air Tanker was staged in Kalgoorlie to the East. These resources were all sent to combat the incident.

The incident was declared Level 3 at 2.30pm and extreme fire behaviour resulted in emergency warnings being issued to many communities including the town of Corrigin. Power outages resulted in communications challenges and a subsequent incident near Narrogin made evacuation planning challenging. Due to the extreme weather and fire behaviour the aerial assets were not as effective as in other incidents. These assets were reallocated by the DFES SOC State Operations Air Desk.

The Shackleton Complex Bushfire was similarly impacted by the favourable weather change late on 6 February, however it wasn’t until 10 February that the incident was considered contained and controlled. The Shackleton Complex Bushfire burned through an area of 44,600 ha and was comprised of two independent fires. The terrain was predominantly lightly undulating open farmland and woodland north of Corrigin. The Shackleton Complex contained the largest losses of the four incidents reporting 15 houses and 54 structures. In addition to the 54 other structures were the loss of significant amounts of breeding livestock and feed.

Narrogin East bushfire 

Just over an hour after the ignition of Shackleton Complex incident another incident, known as the Narrogin East bushfire, was reported at 10.42am in the Shire of Narrogin, 170 km South East of Perth. Like the Shackleton Complex incident, it quickly escalated to catastrophic fire conditions reaching Level 3 by 5.20pm. The declaration of this incident brought a situation where DFES was now responding to Level 3 incidents in four separate locations across the state.

The Narrogin East Bushfire affected an area of 17,851 ha. It was located in a rural setting of the Wheatbelt similar to the Shackleton Complex and saw the loss of 31 buildings. The loss of a commercial piggery containing 5000 livestock and the closure of several significant transport routes were the most significant impacts of the Narrogin East incident.